






Warsaw Groundhog Days 
Old Friends, Positions and Impasses Revisited All Over Again at the 
2013 Warsaw Climate Conference 
 
By Wolfgang Sterk, Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Nicolas Kreibich,  






Wuppertal, December 2013 
2 Warsaw Groundhog Days 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
Content 
Content ................................................................................................................ 2
1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 3
2. ADP Workstream 1 - Negotiating a New Climate Agreement ....................... 4
2.1 Roadmap to Paris ................................................................................................. 4
2.2 Building Blocks of the New Agreement .............................................................. 7
3. ADP Workstream 2 - Enhancing Short-Term Ambition ................................. 8
4. Measuring, Reporting and Verification ........................................................ 11
4.1 Annex I MRV .................................................................................................... 11
Reporting guidelines on annual inventories ........................................................... 12
Review of biennial reports and national communications ...................................... 12
4.2 Non-Annex I MRV ............................................................................................ 13
5. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions ................................................... 14
5.1 NAMA registry .................................................................................................. 15
5.2 MRV of domestic NAMAs ................................................................................ 15
5.3 NAMA Guidebook ............................................................................................ 16
6. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation .............. 16
7. Market Mechanisms .................................................................................... 20
7.1 Discussions on New Mechanisms ..................................................................... 20
7.2 Reforming the Existing Flexible Mechanisms .................................................. 22
8. Loss and Damage ....................................................................................... 23
9. Adaptation ................................................................................................... 25
10.Finance ........................................................................................................ 27
11.Technology .................................................................................................. 29
12.Groundhog Day on the Vistula .................................................................... 30
12.1 Assessing the Warsaw Outcome ...................................................................... 30
12.2 Who Will Lead Towards the 2015 Agreement? .............................................. 33
13.How to Escape from Groundhog Day? ....................................................... 34
13.1 A Misguided Narrative of Pain and Sacrifice .................................................. 35
13.2 Pioneers Needed .............................................................................................. 40
13.3 Does the Climate Regime Need New Types of Mitigation Commitments? .... 41
13.4 Considering Multi-Dimensional Commitments .............................................. 43
 
 
Warsaw Groundhog Days 3 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
1. Introduction 
In what has become normal procedure at the international climate negotiations, the 
annual United Nations climate conference (the nineteenth Conference of the Parties 
(COP 19) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the ninth Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP 9)) this year once again seemed on the brink of collapse and concluded 
more than one day behind schedule, in the evening of Saturday 23 November. However, 
on most of the key issues it yielded little to show as result of the overtime work. Little 
was expected: The process that was launched in 2011 in Durban to develop a new 
comprehensive climate agreement is to conclude only in 2015, so the main “big picture” 
issue was to agree on a roadmap for the next two years. However, even here countries 
managed to disappoint expectations and agreed only on the bare minimum needed to 
move the process forward.  
As last year, the start of the conference saw the Philippines being shattered by a super 
typhoon of unprecedented proportions. In September, the first part of the new 
assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) posited 
that it is 95% certain that human influence is the dominant cause of global warming and 
that its impacts will likely be worse than previously thought.1 
Notwithstanding the increasingly dire warnings by climate science and actual climate 
impacts, the climate negotiations continue to be bereft of any sense of urgency. To the 
contrary, the conference’s host Poland deemed it fit to organise a coal summit in 
parallel to the climate conference and Japan apparently thought that a climate 
conference was a good occasion to announce a substantial downgrade of its 2020 
emission target, from -25% to about +3% compared to 1990 levels. Other industrialised 
countries had little more to brag about. The newly elected conservative Australian 
government is moving to dismantle the climate legislation put in place by the previous 
Labour government and the EU is incapable of increasing its 20% target for 2020 even 
though it has already been achieved. Taking into account offsets surrendered in the EU 
ETS, the EU in 2012 in fact accounted for emission reductions of 27% below 1990 
levels.2 If it does not increase its target, the EU can thus be expected to amass a 
substantial surplus of emission units. This lack of industrialised country leadership 
made it easy for some emerging economy countries to dig in their heels on the 
substantive issues of the 2015 agreement.  
                                                
1 Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC 5th 
Assessment Report, Final Draft Underlying Scientific-Technical Assessment. Online at 
http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/, last accessed 13 December 2013. 
2 Sandbag: EU climate policy outpaced by emissions reductions, 9 October 2013. Online at 
http://www.sandbag.org.uk/blog/2013/oct/9/eu-climate-policy-outpaced-emissions-reductions/, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
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This report lays out the main developments in Warsaw and assesses the main outcomes. 
It starts with the discussions under the Durban Platform on developing a new 
comprehensive climate agreement by 2015 and increasing short-term ambition and 
subsequently covers the issues relating to near-term implementation of previous 
decisions in the areas of emission reductions and transparency, adaptation, loss and 
damage, finance and technology.  
2. ADP Workstream 1 - Negotiating a New 
Climate Agreement 
2.1 Roadmap to Paris 
After the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, countries decided at the 2011 
conference in Durban to make a new attempt to develop a comprehensive climate 
agreement. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) aims to develop a new agreement “applicable to all”, which is to be adopted in 
2015 and to be implemented from 2020.  
However, a clear roadmap for the process had so far been lacking, in particular for how 
to determine how exactly countries are going to participate in the new agreement. 
Questions here are whether countries will adopt legally binding commitments or not, 
differentiation among countries, and whether countries may determine the form and 
ambition of their participation purely nationally or whether participation is to be 
negotiated internationally. 
The traditional industrialised countries (listed in Annex I of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) have been keen to break down the so-called “firewall”, 
the clear distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (the traditional 
“developing countries”) that is laid down in the Framework Convention of 1992. They 
argue that this distinction is outdated since many non-Annex I countries are nowadays 
wealthier than many of the traditional industrialised countries and that their contribution 
to global emissions has also grown rapidly. While traditionally legally binding 
commitments have been expected only from Annex I countries, they now demand that 
all countries, in particular the economically more advanced countries of the global 
South, should be on the same legal footing in the new agreement, though not necessarily 
with the same type of commitments. That is, the legal status should in their view be the 
same for everyone though the contents may differ among countries. 
In the past, developing countries united in the “Group of 77 and China”, a strong 
negotiating alliance that allowed developing countries to speak with one voice. While 
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the Group of 77 and China still exists formally, developing countries have, however, 
started organising themselves and communicating in a more differentiated manner in 
recent years. This trend continued also in Warsaw. Some non-Annex I countries, in 
particular the new “Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean” 
(AILAC), which was formed in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Panama and Peru, have staked out an ambitious position and argue that all countries 
should contribute their fair shares. The countries that are most vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the least developed 
countries (LDCs) have also been pushing all major emitters to take stronger action. 
Others, however, in particular the “group of like-minded developing countries 
(LMDCs)”, which includes China and India, some other Asian countries such as 
Pakistan and the Philippines, OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as the left-
leaning Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela, have so far strongly 
resisted any explicit or implicit dissolution of the traditional distinction between the 
Annexes. They have maintained that Annex I countries should continue to take the lead 
since they are the ones who caused the climate problem, even nowadays have much 
larger economic resources to do something about it, and have in the view of these 
countries so far mostly failed to do their homework in terms of reducing their own 
emissions and in providing support to non-Annex I countries. 
In Warsaw, they therefore strongly defended the view that only Annex I countries 
should adopt legally binding commitments, while only “enhanced actions” should be 
demanded from non-Annex I countries. When the co-chairs of the ADP produced a 
draft text that referred to commitments from all Parties, they insisted on inserting 
references to Article 4 of the Framework Convention, which delineates the binary 
historical differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I and in particular conditions 
the extent to which non-Annex I countries will fulfil their commitments to the extent to 
which Annex I countries fulfil their commitments regarding the provision of finance 
and technology. In particular the USA has been adamant in its position that it will not 
accept a continuation of this issue linkage in the 2015 agreement. 
The LMDCs also strongly objected to any notion that the actions of non-Annex I 
countries should be in any way assessed internationally. Annex I countries as well as 
many non-Annex I countries were in favour of setting an early deadline for the 
international submission of initial offers in order to provide sufficient time to countries 
to assess and negotiate each other’s offers. One of the problems of the Copenhagen 
process had been that many countries had put their pledges on the table only one or two 
months before the conference. Based on this experience many countries have been keen 
to avoid a repetition of this situation. Many Annex I and non-Annex I countries were 
also in favour of first defining requirements for which information countries would have 
to submit along with their initial offers in order to provide transparency on the actual 
content of the offers. 
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Many Annex I and non-Annex I countries also supported the establishment of an 
international process to assess whether countries’ initial offers actually represented their 
fair shares and would add up to the globally required level of ambition. However, the 
LMDCs maintained that any such process of assessing offers should only apply to 
Annex I countries but not to non-Annex I countries. 
Ironically, this issue in particular hinged on the principles of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities that are laid down in the 
Convention. One of the key fights on the wording of the Durban Platform decision in 
2011 had been on the question of whether to include explicit references to these 
principles or not. In particular the US had been opposed as it saw them as a Trojan 
Horse to maintain the “firewall” while India had been the fiercest advocate of including 
references. 
In Warsaw, however, it was in particular India that was opposed to establishing a 
process to try to fill these principles with concrete meaning. India and the other LMDCs 
strongly put forward historical responsibility as the overriding criterion. Under the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), Brazil, not a 
member of the LMDCs but strongly supported by them and by the G-77 as a whole, had 
submitted a new version of its old Brazilian proposal that would determine countries’ 
emission reduction contributions on the basis of their historical contribution to global 
temperature increase. Brazil proposed to request the IPCC to develop a methodology to 
quantify each country’s historical responsibility. As in the past, Annex I countries 
rejected this approach as too simplistic and many non-Annex I countries also argued in 
favour of a more multi-dimensional approach. The African group, for example, 
proposed to develop an equity reference framework including not only responsibility 
but also other indicators such as capability and development need to identify countries’ 
fair shares. But India objected to any mentioning of an equity reference framework.  
In the end, countries only agreed on the bare minimum necessary to move the process 
forward. Countries are now invited “to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for 
their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature 
of the contributions”. These intended contributions are supposed to be communicated 
“well in advance” of the 2015 COP, “by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready 
to do so”, and “in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding 
of the intended contributions”. The ADP is to identify the information that countries 
will provide accompanying their intended contributions, but only by the 2014 COP in 
Lima, which takes place in December of next year.3  
                                                
3 Decision -/CP.19, Further advancing the Durban Platform, Advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_adp.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
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2.2 Building Blocks of the New Agreement 
In addition to the overarching architecture issues, Parties also addressed the individual 
building blocks of the new agreement. One area of contention was whether to include  
“indicative elements of the 2015 agreement” or a “non-exhaustive list of areas for 
further reflection” as an annex to the decision or conclusions. While many Annex I non-
Annex I countries were in favour of capturing progress made in such a list, others 
argued that such a list would need to be negotiated and that there was not enough time. 
The list was ultimately deleted. 
Regarding substance, developing countries stressed that not only mitigation but also 
adaptation needed to be a core element and emphasised the importance of funding. 
Parties also exchanged views on the role existing institutional adaptation arrangements 
could play and on how ongoing processes could be used in the new agreement. Several 
developing and developed countries stressed that the process on national adaptation 
plans should be a key element for adaptation in the new agreement. Different positions 
emerged, however, with regard to the proposal made by the African Group to set a 
global goal for adaptation based on the estimated costs for adaptation needs in different 
emission scenarios. While several developing countries stressed the need to establish 
such a goal, developed countries raised significant concerns with this approach. The 
United States, for instance, questioned the possibility to globally add up location and 
sector-specific adaptation costs, and raised general concerns that such a global goal 
might potentially undermine mitigation ambition. In its final decision, the Conference 
of the Parties requests the ADP to elaborate elements for a draft negotiating text by 
building on these discussions at the next ADP meeting in 2014.  
Non-Annex I countries also generally called for a scale-up of public climate finance and 
for a strengthening of the measuring, reporting and verification of the provision of 
support. They also emphasised that the finance part of the new agreement should have 
the same legal force as the other parts and that there should be aggregate and individual 
finance targets for Annex I countries, and a clear roadmap for the scale-up of finance, 
with the 100 billion USD promised for 2020 as the starting point. Annex I countries for 
their part posited that which parts of the new agreement were to be binding was yet to 
be determined and re-iterated their view on the importance of enabling environments 
within countries to mobilise public and private finance flows. Annex I countries also 
called for “strengthening the donor base”, that is, they called for more countries in 
addition to the traditional donors to become providers of climate finance. Non-Annex I 
countries strongly pushed back against these suggestions, arguing that provision of 
support by industrialised countries was a commitment laid down in the Convention 
while South-South cooperation was of an altogether different character and purely 
voluntary. 
On technology, non-Annex I countries called for the identification of finance to support 
technology transfer, for a link of the technology mechanism to the financial mechanism, 
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and in particular for a dedicated technology window within the Green Climate Fund. 
They also stressed the necessity to remove barriers to technology transfer, including 
intellectual property rights (IPR). Annex I countries for their part reiterated their 
traditional view that IPR were critical to foster innovation, were not main barrier to 
technology transfer, and that this issue was anyhow already being addressed in other 
fora. 
All countries in general agreed on the need to enhance transparency but here as well 
there continued to be a clear fault line between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. 
While Annex I countries want to align requirements for all countries as much as 
possible, in particular the LMDCs pushed back, arguing that attempts to develop 
common accounting rules would delay action and progress. Non-Annex I countries also 
called for more transparency on the provision of support. 
3. ADP Workstream 2 - Enhancing Short-Term 
Ambition 
Alongside the new climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, the ADP’s Workstream 2 
discusses measures to increase the short-term ambition of mitigation measures. This 
workstream was established in Durban as the level of ambition of the mitigation pledges 
countries have made for the time until 2020 is far below what would be necessary to 
achieve the agreed goal of keeping global warming below 2°C. The United Nations 
Environment Programme’s annual “Emissions Gap Report” estimates the gap between 
the current level of ambition and what is necessary at 8-12 gigatonnes of CO2-eq.4 It 
was also part of a balanced agreement: Workstream 2 has been considered by most 
developing countries as an essential stepping stone for the development of a new 
climate regime under Workstream 1. In their view, raising the level of ambition for pre-
2020 under Workstream 2 has to be done within the existing Annex structure of the 
UNFCCC with all its implications: Annex I countries are required to lead and to support 
any mitigation action by Non-Annex I parties with finance, technology and capacity 
building, often referred to as “means of implementation”. Under this premise, Japan’s 
announcement to drastically reduce the ambition of its 2020 commitment from -25% to 
+3.1% as compared to 1990 levels5, had a devastating effect on the negotiation 
dynamics.  
                                                
4 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2013. Online at 
http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2013/, last accessed 6 December 2013. 
5 Climate Action Tracker (2013). Japan reverses Copenhagen pledge, widens global emissions gap, 
nuclear shutdown not to blame. Online at: http://climateactiontracker.org/news/147/Japan-reverses-
Copenhagen-pledge-widens-global-emissions-gap-nuclear-shutdown-not-to-blame.html, last accessed 
3 December 2013. 
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The sorrow on the side of developed country mitigation was not relieved by strong and 
clear support for developing country mitigation. The picture of the available support for 
mitigation action in developing countries is a mixed one. Financial support for NAMAs 
is becoming available, however, there is still a lack of coordination of the donors and on 
the receiving end. According to donors the information available on the NAMA registry 
is not sufficient to allow for making decisions to select and support a particular NAMA. 
At the same time developing countries stated that the information templates required for 
the NAMA registry are extremely complex. Given that the GCF as the intended main 
channel of multinational support is still not operating, some developing countries have 
been hesitant to enter proposals into the NAMA registry and have instead sought for 
bilateral support. The British-German NAMA Facility is one of the most advanced 
actors in the field. At a side-event in Warsaw the NAMA Facility presented its first 
achievements. In a first tranche of EUR 70 million the Facility granted support to five 
selected NAMAs in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia and Mexico. These are 
however only five of the 47 NAMAs that applied.6 The high number of applications to 
the NAMA Facility illustrates the interest of many developing countries in going 
forward with their proposed NAMAs.  
Given the continued uncertainty on the future availability of funding and the still not 
operational Green Climate Fund, developing countries have been hesitant to further 
increase their ambition under Workstream 2 and instead repeatedly insisted on 
improving the means of implementation. Developing countries demanded a clear 
roadmap to scale up climate finance to the 100 billion USD promised for 2020, with a 
milestone of 70 billion USD to be achieved in 2016. As in Workstream 1, developing 
country Parties also reiterated their call for discussions on IPRs and patents to be made 
available to developing countries, however, without creating much resonance from their 
developed country counterparts. 
In the run-up to the Warsaw summit Nauru had submitted a detailed proposal on behalf 
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). AOSIS proposed to establish a 
“Warsaw Workplan” to identify and evaluate different technological and policy options 
to abate greenhouse gas emissions at a technical level, with a view to subsequently 
implement these options on a larger scale. A specific focus was to be laid on options to 
increase the deployment of renewable energies and increase energy efficiency.7 The 
proposal received positive feedback from many industrialized countries including the 
                                                
6 Side Event: Financing the implementation of transformational NAMAs through the International NAMA 
Facility. held on Friday 15 November 2013 at the National Stadium in Warsaw during UNFCCC 
COP19. 
7 AOSIS 2013. Submission by the Republic of Nauru on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) - Information, views and proposal from Parties and observer organizations on actions, 
initiatives and options to enhance ambition, including through the workplan on enhancing mitigation 
ambition, and on further activities for its plan of work in 2014 and proposals for a more balanced, 
focused and formal mode of work indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the ADP conclusions. 1 
September 2013. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_aosis_workstre
am_2_20130911.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013. 
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United States and the EU. These parties also reiterated their previous proposals to 
develop so-called ‘international cooperative initiatives’. Under these initiatives a 
number of mitigation options could be leveraged. In addition to the afore-mentioned 
renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, the most intensively discussed 
options are phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies, reduction of emissions from international 
bunker fuels (that is, international aviation and shipping), and regulation of fluorinated 
hydrocarbons (HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. To facilitate discussions, the UNFCCC Secretariat had prepared a detailed 
technical paper on options to enhance mitigation.8  
Nonetheless, the only cooperative initiative that moved forward in Warsaw was the 
promotion of mitigation (and adaptation) activities by cities and other subnational 
authorities. During the Warsaw talks an in-session workshop was held on urbanisation 
and the role of sub-national governments in facilitating climate action in cities. This 
workshop focussed on urban transportation and efficient buildings. The workshop was 
well regarded and parties expressed their interest in continuing the work in this field. 
Consequently the ADP agreed to “convene [...] a forum to help share among Parties the 
experiences and best practices of cities and subnational authorities in relation to 
adaptation and mitigation“ in June 2014.9 
Despite the positive feedback from many developed countries, other more concrete 
mitigation work programmes did not go forward. Developing countries, specifically the 
LMDCs, highlighted repeatedly that increased ambition in the pre-2020 period must be 
realized under the UNFCCC in accordance with the Convention’s principles and not 
through yet another technical process. Two important arguments are reflected in this 
statement: Firstly, developing countries accused developed countries of seeking to 
engage in these international cooperative initiatives mainly to excuse themselves from 
inaction in terms of more ambitious mitigation commitments. Secondly, they viewed 
these proposals as an attempt to shift the responsibility for additional mitigation to 
developing countries and to further dilute the differentiation between Annex I and Non-
Annex I countries already for the period before the new agreement enters into force. 
Developing countries therefore repeatedly called on developed countries to increase 
their emission reduction commitments to -40% below 1990 levels, arguing that this 
would be sufficient to close the mitigation gap. Due to these reservations it was not 
possible to agree on a concrete work plan. Instead, Parties agreed to convene technical 
expert meetings at the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies to the Convention in June 
2014. 
One option for additional mitigation where progress seemed possible in the run-up to 
Warsaw was regulating HFCs under the Montreal Protocol. This option has been 
                                                
8 Updated compilation of information on mitigation benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance 
mitigation ambition, FCCC/TP/2013/8, 30 October 2013. 
9 Conclusions proposed by the Co-Chairs as adopted by the ADP, Advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp_conclusions_as_adopted.pdf, last accessed 12 
December 2013.  
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discussed for several years now and under various fora. In June an agreement between 
the United States and China to work together on phasing out HFCs made the news,10 
and there was a similar agreement at the G20 summit in September 2013. However, at 
the most recent Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP25: 21-25 October 
2013) it was not possible to make substantial progress on the issue and the same 
dividing lines appeared in Warsaw. A number of Parties, including India and Saudi 
Arabia, strongly opposed a paragraph which invited “other relevant multilateral fora to 
cooperate in the phasing down of the production and consumption of 
hydrofluorocarbons.“ Hence, it was not possible to come to a consensus on this 
proposal and it is not mentioned in the final conclusion. 
All in all, the negotiations under the ADP’s Workstream 2 did not deliver substantial 
progress in Warsaw. The lowest common denominator that parties agreed to is to 
continue the discussion on how to increase the level of ambition for pre-2020 mitigation 
at a ministerial meeting on the occasion of the meeting of the subsidiary bodies to the 
UNFCCC in June 2014. A ministerial meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol had 
already been scheduled before and will now be amended to include high-level 
representatives of countries that are not a party to the Kyoto Protocol. 
A little surprising is the invitation to parties to voluntarily cancel certified emission 
reductions generated under the Clean Development Mechanism as a means to close the 
mitigation gap. 
4. Measuring, Reporting and Verification 
4.1 Annex I MRV 
As more and more key industrialised countries are dropping out of the Kyoto Protocol it 
becomes increasingly important that MRV rules under the UNFCCC are 
environmentally sound and stringent. At COP 16 and 17 in Cancún and Durban Parties 
had agreed to enhance Annex I national communications and to additionally require 
biennial reports outlining progress in achieving emission reductions and the provision 
of support to non-Annex I countries.   
In Warsaw, two decisions relevant to MRV of Annex I countries were taken, on: 
                                                
10 White House Press Office (2013): United States and China Agree to Work Together on Phase Down of 
HFCs. Press Release. 8 June 2013. Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/08/united-states-and-china-agree-work-together-phase-down-hfcs, last accessed 3 
December 2013. 
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• the “Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for 
Parties included in Annex I to the Convention”,11 and 
• the “Work programme on the revision of the guidelines for the review of 
biennial reports and national communications, including national inventory 
reviews, for developed country Parties".12 
Reporting guidelines on annual inventories 
COP 17 had adopted a revision of the previously existing guidelines for a trial period 
and in 2013 Parties reported on their experience with using the new guidelines and 
suggested a number of improvements. The Warsaw conference on this basis adopted 
revised guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Annex I Parties.13 
These include: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on GHG inventories, revised common 
reporting format (CRF) tables and global warming potential values. These guidelines 
have to be used for the preparation of Annex I Parties’ inventories from 2015 on. 
Voluntarily the new IPCC methods on wetlands were included, which provides the 
basis to report on wetlands in a transparent and common format. 
 Review of biennial reports and national communications 
As the guidelines for GHG inventories were revised, it also became necessary to 
subsequently revise the guidelines for the review process. In Warsaw, guidelines for the 
technical review of information reported in GHG inventories, biennial reports and 
national communications by Annex I countries were adopted.14  
From an MRV perspective it was important to come to an agreement and establish 
guidelines to be used for the review of the first biennial reports, starting in 2014.  
Important to note is the decision that in those years when only biennial reports are to be 
reviewed, there will be a “centralised review” in Bonn. Whereas only in those years 
when national communications are to be reported, the review will be an in-country 
review. This decision is beneficial from the perspective of keeping efforts for MRV 
reasonable. 
                                                
11 Decision -/CP.19, Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties 
included in Annex I to the Convention, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_inv_rep_gdln.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013. 
12 Decision -/CP.19, Work programme on the revision of the guidelines for the review of biennial reports 
and national communications, including national inventory reviews, for developed country Parties, 
advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_review_crf.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
13 Annex I reporting guidelines revision, supra note 11. 
14 CRF review work programme, supra note 12. 
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4.2 Non-Annex I MRV 
Related to MRV for non-Annex I countries two issues were negotiated in Warsaw: 
1. The continuation and revised terms of references for the Consultative Group of 
Experts (CGE) on non-Annex 1 national communications,15 and 
2. the composition of the team of technical experts under international consultation 
and analysis (ICA).16 
4.3 Non-Annex I NatCom – Consultative Group of Experts 
The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from non-
Annex I Parties aims at improving the process of and preparation of national 
communications and biennial update reports by providing technical support and advice. 
In Warsaw the terms references of the CGE have been revised, mainly to include 
biennial update reports into the scope of the CGE. Most importantly it was decided that 
the work of the CGE is to be continued for five years (2014-2018) – which is an 
improvement over Doha were the decision had only been to continue the work for one 
year.17 Thus the CGE can now develop a work program for the next five years. 
4.4 Teams of technical experts for International Consultation and Analysis 
(ICA) 
The ICA process is one of the innovations developed as part of the Bali process. So far 
the national communications of developing countries have not been subject to 
international scrutiny and there was also no requirement to submit them at particular 
intervals. As part of the Cancún Agreements Parties resolved to require submission of 
non-Annex I national communications every four years as well as submission of 
biennial update reports every two years, and to conduct a “non-intrusive” process of 
international consultation and analysis. The decision on the “Composition, modalities 
and procedures of the team of technical experts (TTE) under international consultations 
and analysis” was a left-over from Doha, were only a draft decision text had been 
forwarded to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its thirty-eighth session in 
Warsaw. With the decisions taken this year, the ICA process is operational.18 
                                                
15 Decision -/CP.19, Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties 
not included in Annex I to the Convention, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_cge_natcom_nai.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013. 
16 Decision -/CP.19, Composition, modalities and procedures of the team of technical experts under 
international consultation and analysis, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_tte_ica.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
17 Non-Annex-I NatCom, supra note 15. 
18 ICA teams of experts, supra note 16. 
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The most important issue in Warsaw was the decision on the composition on the teams 
of technical experts. Controversies revolved around which experts were to conduct the 
technical analysis foreseen as part of the ICA. The conference ultimately agreed that: 
• Each TTE shall be led by two chairs: one from an Annex I and another from a 
non-Annex I Party. 
• The overall composition of the TTEs shall be such that the majority of experts 
come from non-Annex I Parties. 
5. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
One of the key elements of the Bali Action Plan was the provision that non-Annex I 
countries are to undertake “nationally appropriate mitigation actions (…) in the context 
of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”.19 Many countries 
submitted lists of NAMAs under the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements. 
In addition, COP 16 and COP 17 decided that NAMAs can be submitted through a web-
­based registry to record mitigation actions and information and support.  
In Warsaw, both formal decisions on NAMAs as well as other information provided in 
the negotiations and COP side events confirmed a growing consensus that NAMAs are 
to be developed and defined via a bottom-up process – and not via strict UNFCCC 
decisions. Based on the three cornerstones of NAMAs (contribution to mitigation, in the 
context of sustainable development and being MRVable) a concept emerges of what 
constitutes a NAMA in both informal and UNFCCC driven processes.20 However, not a 
single criterion exists which would prohibit a country from calling any mitigation action 
a NAMA if it wishes to do so. This is in line with the voluntary nature of NAMAs and 
the general intention to raise mitigation ambition through a deliberately wide range of 
nationally appropriate actions. 
                                                
19 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008. 
20 Such as the “Workplan to further the understanding of the diversity of NAMAs”, FCCC/SBI/2013/L.8. 
Online at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbi/eng/l08.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013. 
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5.1 NAMA registry 
Building on a previous version, prior to the COP a new and now webbased prototype of 
the NAMA registry was launched by the UNFCCC secretariat.21 It is clearly not the 
intention of the registry to serve as an MRV tool,22 but  
• to give guidance and support in the NAMA development process, especially for 
those NAMAs which seek international funding, 
• to provide information on NAMAs in preparation as well as those already being 
implemented – contributing to a better picture on the diversity of NAMAs, 
• to provide a platform for developing countries to demonstrate their mitigation 
activities. 
It is fully voluntary which activities developing countries choose to announce in the 
registry and which kind of information they provide on registered NAMAs. 
5.2 MRV of domestic NAMAs 
The Doha conference had agreed to develop guidelines for MRV of domestically 
supported NAMAs, that is, NAMAs that do not receive international support. 
Nonetheless, in 2013 a number of non-Annex I countries continued to dispute the need 
for such guidelines. While Annex I countries as well as some non-Annex I countries 
have been keen to maximise the provision of information, other non-Annex I countries 
have been concerned about minimising the extent of international intrusion.   
The decisions on the “guidelines for domestic measurement, reporting and verification 
of domestically supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties”23 confirm the view that MRV of domestic NAMAs is fully at the 
discretion of the respective countries. 
The principle of the guidelines is that they are “general, voluntary, pragmatic, non-
prescriptive, non-intrusive and country driven”. Parties are invited to use the guidelines 
on a voluntary basis. Factually the information / guidance given on how to set up MRV 
systems for domestic NAMAs are minimal in content.  
                                                
21 UNFCCC NAMA registry. Online at http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/nama/SitePages/Home.aspx. 
22 see Röser et al. (eds.) (2013): Annual Status Report on NAMAs. Online at: 
http://www.ecofys.com/files/files/mitigation-momentum-annual-status-report-2013.pdf, last accessed 12 
December 2013.  
23  Decision -/CP.19, General guidelines for domestic measurement, reporting and verification of 
domestically supported nationally appropriate matigation actions by developing country Parties, 
advance unedited version. Online at 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_domestic_mrv.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013. 
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This falls in line with the general view described above that NAMAs should be 
developed bottom-up and although good MRV is generally considered important, the 
development and implementation of NAMAs should not be hindered by formal MRV 
requirements. 
5.3 NAMA Guidebook 
UNFCCC, UNEP and UNDP published a common NAMA guidebook, which was 
presented at a side-event in Warsaw. Although it is obviously not an official document, 
it gives good insight what the general thinking on NAMAs currently is. The title in 
itself: “Guidance for NAMA design – building on country experiences” again reiterates 
the bottom-up nature of the NAMA concept.24 
6. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
After eight years of intense discussions, in Warsaw Parties were able to finalise a 
package of decisions on a programme for the protection, conservation and rehabilitation 
of forests, resulting in the so-called “Warsaw Framework for REDD+25 Action”. 
Deforestation and forest degradation account for about 1/5 of global CO2 emissions but 
had historically not been tackled within the UNFCCC. 
Negotiations in Warsaw were able to build on significant progress achieved at the 
climate talks in Bonn in June 2013 as well as on discussions in workshops held 
throughout the year. This allowed Parties not only to reach agreement on the question of 
financing but it was also possible to agree on a number of methodological issues. With 
these decisions, seven in total, the conditions under which developing countries can 
access results-based payments for emission reductions achieved in the forestry sector 
have been established.   
Negotiations were held in three different fora: While methodological issues were 
discussed under the SBSTA, there was a joint SBI/SBSTA work programme on 
institutional arrangements and a COP work programme on results-based finance. The 
discussions on methodological issues had already made considerable progress in the 
SBSTA negotiations held in Bonn in June 2013. With the SBI being blocked due to 
                                                
24  Søren E. Lütken et.al. (2013): Guidance for Nama Design - Building on Country Experiences. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/nama/application/pdf/guidance_for_nama_design_%282013
%29_final.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013. 
25 REDD+: “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”. 
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Russia’s, Belarus’ and Ukraine’s reluctance to adopt the agenda, additional time could 
be spent in the SBSTA negotiations. This had not only allowed to rebuild trust among 
Parties but also led to agreement on three draft decisions that were adopted by the COP 
in Warsaw, namely on National Forest Monitoring Systems (NFMS)26, on provisions 
regarding the timing and frequency by which REDD+ countries are to present a 
summary of the information on how social and environmental safeguards are being 
addressed and respected,27 and on drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.28 In 
addition, progress was made on the question of how the forest reference (emissions) 
levels REDD+ countries propose to be used as a baseline for calculating their 
greenhouse gas reductions or sequestrations should be technically assessed. Equally, the 
discussions on measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), one of the crunch 
issues of the Doha negotiations on REDD+ in 2012, had made considerable progress. 
In Warsaw, the SBSTA negotiations on REDD+ started with civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and indigenous peoples groups expressing their concerns regarding the draft 
decisions agreed in Bonn, whose text had been significantly modified in the last 
moments of the Bonn negotiations. Criticism was raised against the lack of explicit 
provisions on reporting on safeguards and on the strong link established between 
livelihoods and drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. CSOs criticised that the 
draft decision on drivers developed in Bonn suggests that local communities and 
indigenous peoples are the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, while 
there is no reference to international commodity chains or large corporate producers 
Notably, several Parties shared these concerns, in particular the reference to livelihood 
as a driver of deforestation, but decided not to reopen the agreed text. Instead, Parties 
followed the Norwegian proposal to include additional guidance on reporting of 
safeguards in the finance decision and to insert a paragraph in the COP report which 
clarifies that livelihoods cannot be considered the main drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation. 
With the decision not to reopen the three draft decisions developed in Bonn, the 
REDD+ negotiations under SBSTA concentrated on the two outstanding 
methodological issues, namely modalities for MRV and guidelines for the technical 
assessment of proposed forest reference (emissions) levels. 
                                                
26 Decision -/CP.19, Modalities for national forest monitoring systems, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_fms.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
27 Decision -/CP.19, The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of information on how 
all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected, 
advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_safeguards_ 
1cp16a1.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013. 
28 Decision -/CP.19 Addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, advance unedited 
version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_drivers_deforestatio
n.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013.    
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The question of verification had led to controversies between developing and developed 
countries and prevented an agreement on REDD+ in Doha in 2012, with Norway 
pushing for independent verification of actions by international experts and Brazil 
arguing that verification of REDD+ should be consistent with the considerably softer 
process of International Consultation and Analysis which had been agreed for NAMAs. 
In contrast, in Warsaw Parties were able to find common ground on MRV. The final 
decision29 requires REDD+ countries seeking to receive results-based payments to 
submit a technical annex together with their biennial update report (BUR) and to allow 
the data and information to be analysed by a technical team of experts, consisting of two 
LULUCF experts, one each from a developing and a developed country. The decision 
further contains provisions on the type of information the annex must contain, the type 
of analysis to be conducted and the modes of interaction between the technical team of 
experts and the developing country. 
Similarly, Parties agreed on a process for the technical assessment of reference 
(emissions) levels submitted by REDD+ countries.30 The technical assessment of the 
reference (emissions) levels is intended to “offer a facilitative, non-intrusive, technical 
exchange of information […] with a view to supporting the capacity of developing 
country Parties”31. In response to the inputs of the assessment team, developing 
countries may also modify the submitted forest reference (emissions) level in the course 
of the assessment process. With Parties agreeing on these issues during the first week of 
negotiations, SBSTA was able to forward the two draft decisions together with the draft 
decisions from Bonn to the COP. However, the draft decisions were forwarded in 
brackets, making their adoption dependent on the progress in the COP work programme 
on results-based finance for REDD+. 
Under this work programme two workshops had been held during 2013, allowing 
Parties to exchange views on several issues related to REDD+ finance. Parties inter alia 
discussed existing barriers to provide and obtain results-based finance, the need to scale 
up financing for REDD+, the architecture for results-based payments, the role of the 
Green Climate Fund and the link between safeguards and results-based payments. 
Building on these discussions the negotiations in Warsaw made considerable progress 
and Parties were able to adopt a decision on finance.32 Parties agreed to establish an 
information hub on the UNFCCC website to publish information on results from 
REDD+ activities and corresponding results-based payments. In addition, Parties 
                                                
29 Decision -/CP.19, Modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_mrv.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
30 Decision -/CP.19, Guidelines and procedures for the technical assessment of submissions from Parties 
on proposed forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels, advance unedited version. 
Online at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_frl.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
31 ibid. 
32 Decision -/CP.19, Work programme on results-based finance to progress the full implementation of the 
activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_redd_finance.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013.  
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decided that developing countries should provide the most recent summary of 
information on how minimum ecological and social standards (safeguards) have been 
respected and addressed before they can access results-based payments for forest 
mitigation activities; a requirement several non governmental organisations and 
indigenous peoples groups had been calling for. However, negotiators have not yet 
determined the content of these summaries countries are to submit. A final decision on 
this issue is expected to be adopted in Lima at the end of 2014. 
The finance decision further stresses the relevance of positive incentives for non-carbon 
benefits that go beyond the mere reduction of greenhouse gases, allowing for the 
implementation of sustainable forest programmes that do not only reduce greenhouse 
gas emission but also have positive impacts on biodiversity and the livelihood of local 
communities. With regard to the disbursement of results-based finance, the Green 
Climate Fund has been assigned a “key role”33. This clear reference to the GCF has been 
a key ask from Brazil and Bolivia, which have both favoured a non-market based 
approach for REDD+ financing. While Bolivia continuously expressed its opposition to 
any market-based mechanism for REDD+ in the course of the negotiations, Brazil 
reiterated its position that REDD+ shall not be financed via an offsetting mechanism. In 
this context, Brazil further suggested a paragraph to be inserted in the finance decision 
stating that its provisions do not prejudge the eligibility of REDD+ activities vis-à-vis 
the installation of a new market mechanism (NMM) or a framework for various 
approaches (FVA). Parties further request the Standing Committee on Finance to focus 
its next forum on issues related to finance for forest, to allow UNFCCC bodies and 
entities dealing with climate change finance to exchange information on ways and 
means to transfer results-based payments.  
In the negotiations on institutional arrangements and the coordination of support for 
REDD+ activities, the question on whether a REDD+ specific institution should be 
installed proved a key issue of divergence. After no agreement had been reached on the 
issue during the negotiations under the joint SBI/SBSTA work programme in the first 
week of the negotiations, a draft text containing three different options was forwarded 
to the COP and discussions continued during the second week of the talks. As in Doha, 
Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) tried again 
to push its proposal for a specific REDD+ body under the COP. The new institution 
envisioned by CfRN was to become the overall advisory body to the COP on REDD+ 
related issues and to fulfil a large number of functions, such as to provide guidance on 
REDD+ to relevant UNFCCC bodies and to manage and coordinate requests for support 
of REDD+ activities. Other countries, among them the EU, USA and Norway but also 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia, however, did not see the need to install a new REDD+ 
institution at the international level. During the process of the negotiations, several 
Parties instead agreed with Brazil’s position on the need to have coordination entities at 
the national level. 
                                                
33 ibid. 
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Accordingly, the final decision34 does not install a REDD+ body but invites Parties to 
designate national entities (or focal points) at the national level that are to serve for the 
coordination of support of REDD+ and communicate with the relevant bodies of the 
Convention. These entities are encouraged to meet on an annual basis with Parties and 
relevant entities financing REDD+ activities. Parties further requested the SBI to review 
the outcomes of these meetings and to make recommendations on institutional 
arrangements at its 47th session (end of 2017) at the latest, leaving some room for the 
installation of a REDD+ institution at a later point in time.35    
7. Market Mechanisms 
7.1 Discussions on New Mechanisms 
Parties have been discussing options for scaling up existing and/or introducing new 
market mechanisms for many years. These discussions have been partly inspired by 
perceived weaknesses of the existing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Reform 
of the CDM itself has also been divisive topic in recent years. How to move forward 
with market mechanisms has become particularly salient in view of the low demand for 
carbon credits, which has caused carbon prices to drop to close to zero.  
As in the previous years, the advancement of new carbon markets and reforming the 
existing flexible mechanisms proved difficult in Warsaw. The conference started off 
with an unexpected proposal by Brazil that suggested to enable countries to count pre-
2020 mitigation actions as well as credits stemming from the Kyoto mechanisms 
towards the commitments of the post-2020 agreement. In terms of the Kyoto 
mechanisms, Brazil proposed promoting the voluntary cancellation of CERs, among 
other things, by private sector entities, civil society, and even individuals. Moreover, it 
suggested that Parties could voluntarily cancel CERs and ERUs, which would then be 
recognized and “added to [the Party’s] contribution under the new instrument”. Yet this 
proposal did not get enough support among Parties and was not pursued further. The 
final decision on further advancing the Durban Platform, however, contains a general 
                                                
34 Decision -/CP.19, Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to mitigation 
actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including institutional arrangements, advance 
unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_mitigationactions_fo
rest.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013.  
35 ibid. 
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call for Parties “to promote the voluntary cancellation of certified emission reductions, 
without double counting, as a means of closing the pre-2020 ambition gap”.36    
Establishing new market-based mitigation instruments has been on the agenda of the 
climate talks for a couple of years now. Views on this matter differ greatly, with the EU 
promoting the top-down “new market mechanism” (NMM) as defined by the Durban 
conference, while Japan, the US and other industrialised countries are in favour of a 
bottom-up “framework for various approaches” (FVA) that should accommodate 
national offsetting schemes like the Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), with 
nationally defined (and potentially less stringent) accounting rules. Last but not least, a 
couple of Latin American countries oppose market mechanisms in general. They have 
introduced the notion of non market-based approaches (NMA) into the negotiations. 
As for the new market mechanism, COP 18 in Doha had decided that the Warsaw 
conference was to adopt modalities and procedures for the NMM. Yet times had 
changed since last year’s conference. This was already mirrored in the slow pace of the 
negotiations at the intersessional meeting in Bonn June 2013. Developing countries are 
less and less willing to accept the necessity of new market-based instruments given the 
low level of ambition that developed countries show. A workshop in October that was 
to pave the way to decision making in Warsaw was not able to foster convergence of 
views.  
Thus, the negotiations at Warsaw were characterised by the same antagonism between 
fulfilling the Doha mandate and a complete rejection of market-based mitigation 
measures. Consequently, the negotiation text that was debated shortly before the 
consideration of this agenda item was closed comprised two options: on the one hand, 
putting a moratorium on the new market mechanism, on the other an enumeration of 
elements that the NMM modalities and procedures should cover – comprising, inter 
alia, clarifying the role of the COP, setting standards to achieve a net decrease of GHG 
emissions, developing safeguards for environmental integrity, and stipulating the use of 
conservative methods for the establishment and periodic adjustment of ambitious 
reference levels. This gap proved too wide to bridge, and the negotiations broke down. 
Even the presidency of the COP, who was asked to take over after the talks under the 
SBSTA had failed, could not resolve the impasse. The NMM negotiations will be taken 
up again by the next SBSTA meeting in June 2014. 
In the FVA negotiations, agreement on the basics of the FVA such as common 
accounting rules and an adequate level of transparency proved difficult. Therefore, the 
talks focussed on launching a platform for information exchange, the least 
comprehensive of three options tabled at the afore-mentioned workshop, as a first step. 
An early text proposal mentioned aspects to be included in the platform, such as 
                                                
36 Decision -/CP.19, Further advancing the Durban Platform, para 5©, Advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_adp.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
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methodologies to determine baselines and targets, rules and procedures to ensure 
environmental integrity, arrangements to avoid double counting, and MRV issues. The 
platform was also to incorporate non-market-based approaches.   
Yet, as in the NMM talks, neither the co-chairs of the spin off group nor the COP 
presidency were able to reach consensus. The talks will be continued in June next year.  
The idea of the information sharing platform later appeared in text suggested for the 
ADP decision, yet this language did not make it into the final decision.  
7.2 Reforming the Existing Flexible Mechanisms 
The discussions on reforming the modalities and procedures of the Clean Development 
Mechanism were even more thorny. They started under difficult circumstances as the 
talks on this agenda item of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) should have 
started at this summer’s negotiations in Bonn already. However, controversies about 
procedural matters prevented the SBI agenda from getting adopted and as a result, only 
an informal workshop outside the SBI agenda took place. Moreover, Parties again got 
stuck on the missing demand controversy. No agreement on substance could be 
achieved, and the review of the modalities and procedures was postponed to next year’s 
climate conference.  
Apart from the overall reform discussions, the CMP also discussed its annual guidance 
document. This was the only arena where a few technical advancements are visible. The 
text37 demands, inter alia, clearer rules for projects that are conducted at the same 
physical location at which a terminated project existed. Also, the CDM Executive Board 
(Board) is to evaluate its existing voluntary sustainable development tool and to develop 
“guiding tools” that can help host country authorities monitoring the sustainable 
development benefits of CDM projects.  
On CDM Programmes of Activities, the Board is tasked to analyse the thresholds for 
component project activities and to further improve the regulations for programmes 
taking place in more than one host country. The annual debate on additionality led to 
the repetition of the request to “examine alternative approaches to the demonstration 
and assessment of additionality”.  
The CMP also welcomed progress made in establishing the regional collaboration 
centres set up by the Board that are to foster CDM project activities in underrepresented 
regions. Last but not least, the Board is to collect information on practices for local 
                                                
37 Decision -/CMP.9: Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, advance unedited version. 
Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cmp9_cdm_guidance.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013.  
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stakeholder consultations, in order to assist DNAs in developing guidelines for the 
consultation process.  
The ambition of reforming JI seems to mirror the dwindling significance of the 
mechanism. The review of the Joint Implementation guidelines suffered the same fate as 
reviewing the CDM modalities and procedures – it was postponed to the June 
intersessional meeting. The annual guidance text to JI38 underlines the need to improve 
the mechanism. The Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee is to elaborate on its 
proposals to align JI’s accreditation system with the one of the CDM.  
8. Loss and Damage 
As during last year’s climate negotiations in Doha, this year’s conference in Warsaw 
was overshadowed by announcements of extreme weather events. The devastation 
caused by supertyphoon Hiyan in the Philippines exemplified where the limits of 
adaptation measures lie and pushed the discussion on how to deal with climate-induced 
losses and damages to the centre stage of the negotiations. In Doha, the question on the 
installation of a mechanism on loss and damage already proved to be a crunch issue of 
the negotiations between developed and developing countries and countries agreed on a 
compromise formula, stating that “institutional arrangements, such as an international 
mechanism” would be established in Warsaw. 
In Warsaw, developing countries arrived with the clear goal to establish this 
international mechanism under the COP. The group of G77/China tabled a detailed 
proposal already at the start of the negotiations that the group wanted to be used as a 
basis for textual discussions. The proposal again called for compensation, a concept 
which already in Doha had evoked the fierce opposition of developed countries due to 
concerns regarding financial liability for loss and damage in developing countries. 
Accordingly, developed countries were also unwilling to discuss the issue in Warsaw. 
Despite these continuing fundamental differences, Parties managed to concentrate the 
discussions on the overall purpose of the mechanism, its organisational structure and 
functions, and made slow but steady progress during the first week of the negotiations. 
Some developed countries engaged actively in the negotiations with developing 
countries, such as Norway, who proposed the establishment of the “Warsaw platform 
for loss and damage” under the Cancún Adaptation Framework comprised of three 
elements for the areas of knowledge building, coordination and coherence, and action 
and support. Individual developed countries, however, showed less willingness to 
                                                
38 Decision -/CMP.9: Guidance on the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, advance unedited 
version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cmp9_ji.pdf, last accessed 
12 December 2013.  
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compromise, such as Australia, who inter alia opposed individual elements which 
Parties had already agreed on earlier, like rehabilitation funds. After the negotiations 
had been transferred to the COP, discussions continued throughout the second week of 
the negotiations. The main point of discussions in the final hours of the negotiations 
continued to be the question on where the mechanism should be established. The 
G77/China wanted the mechanism to be established under the COP to reflect the fact 
that the issue goes beyond adaptation and is recognized as the third pillar of the 
UNFCCC next to mitigation and adaptation. Several developed countries generally 
preferred an institutional solution under the Cancún Adaptation Framework, with the 
US being particularly concerned about the financial and legal implications of 
establishing loss and damage as a third pillar. After very intense negotiations Parties 
finally agreed to install the “Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage 
associated with climate change impacts”.39 
Contrary to what developing countries had originally asked for, this international 
mechanism will however not be set up under the COP but be established under the 
Cancún Adaptation Framework. Developing countries agreed on this compromise after 
intensive discussions in the plenary, which had in return ensured them a review of the 
mechanism’s structures, its mandate and efficiency by 2016. With this review, there is 
still the possibility to move the mechanism out of the Cancún Adaptation Framework 
and lift it to a higher level in the future. Developing countries further managed to 
include a passage in the preamble which acknowledges that “loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases 
involves more than, that which can be reduced by adaptation.”40 This can be considered 
a first recognition of the fact that loss and damage goes beyond adaptation. 
The decision outlines three broad working areas, each containing a list of functions the 
mechanism is to fulfil: Enhancement of knowledge and understanding of risk 
management approaches to address loss and damage, strengthening interaction among 
relevant stakeholders and the enhancement of action and support. The implementation 
of these functions will be guided by the executive committee of the mechanism, which 
is to report annually to the COP through the subsidiary bodies and make 
recommendations. As an interim measure, this committee will consist of representatives 
from several existing bodies, including the Adaptation Committee and the Standing 
Committee on Finance, until a final decision on the composition and the procedures of 
the committee is adopted. Parties requested the subsidiary bodies SBSTA and SBI to 
make recommendations on this matter to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at 
their next meeting in Lima in December 2014. 
                                                
39 Decision -/CP.19, Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_lossanddamage.pdf, 
last accessed 12 December 2013. 
40 ibid. Emphasis added. 
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9. Adaptation 
With the negotiations on a mechanism for loss and damage being at the centre stage of 
the negotiations, the general focus of the attention was on how to deal with climate 
related impacts that go beyond adaptation. In parallel, however, discussions on 
adaptation-related issues were held in different other fora, making the process 
particularly challenging for smaller countries’ delegations. 
One issue was the question on the continuation and future design of the Nairobi Work 
Programme (NWP), which supports developing countries in the analysis and assessment 
of adaptation-related issues and is to lead to improved decision-making and 
implementation of measures. In advance of the negotiations on the NWP, a technical 
paper on the use of indigenous and traditional knowledge and the application of gender 
sensitive approaches was prepared, and several Parties made submissions suggesting 
different topics the NWP should focus on. In the final decision41, Parties agreed on a 
continuation of the work programme for further 5 years and decided to widen its scope 
and enhance the coordination with other bodies and processes. The SBSTA, responsible 
for carrying out the NWP, is to inter alia consider the issues of ecosystems, human 
settlements, water resources and health and to further discuss issues for consideration 
under the NWP at its 41st session in December 2014. Parties further agreed that the 
activities undertaken under the work programme should integrate gender issues, 
indigenous and traditional knowledge and the role and impacts on ecosystems. SBSTA 
is further requested to review the Nairobi work programme at its 48th session and to 
report to the COP at its 24th session. 
Warsaw also saw the presentation of the Adaptation Committee’s first thematic report 
on the current status of adaptation, which was generally well received. The Adaptation 
Committee (AC), which was established in 2010 in Cancún as the main body dealing 
with adaptation issues under the Convention, had held its first meeting in 2012 and had 
elaborated a draft workplan, which was adopted by the COP in Doha. In Warsaw, 
Parties welcomed the progress made in the implementation of this three-year work plan, 
and encouraged the AC to continue its work. Given the difficult financial situation of 
the committee, all Parties, not only developed countries, as G77/China had demanded, 
were again encouraged to make available sufficient resources for the successful 
implementation of the workplan in the future.42 The general lack of funding for 
adaptation measures was highlighted by developing countries as a crucial problem in 
several meetings. Against this background, it was praised as a ray of hope when the 
                                                
41 Decision -/CP.19, Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change 
work programme [sic!], advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_nairobiwp.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
42 Decision -/CP.19, Work of the Adaptation Committee, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_adaptationcommitte
e.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013.  
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Adaptation Fund was able to meet its goal of raising 100 million USD due to the 
pledges made by several European countries in Warsaw.  
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10. Finance 
The mobilisation of adequate financing balanced between mitigation and adaptation 
measures has been one of the major "crunch issues" in the negotiations for a long time. 
With the establishment and subsequent operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund, 
hopes of developing countries had been high prior to Warsaw that industrialised 
countries would start capitalising the fund in order to raise it from its current status of 
an "empty shell". Funding commitments for the GCF would in part also address what 
proved to be a major stumbling block in this year's negotiations: How will industrialised 
countries reach their stated goal to raise their finance efforts to a steady annual global 
sum of 100 billion USD in 2020?  
The GCF still had not been fully operationalised prior to the Warsaw COP, which made 
industrialised countries' finance ministries hesitate to commit financial resources. For a 
full operationalisation, the relationship between the COP and the GCF had to be 
clarified and adopted by this year's COP. To this end the UNFCCC’s Standing 
Committee on Climate Finance had prepared draft arrangements that passed muster 
without strong dissent among country delegations.43 The arrangements state that the 
GCF is to be guided by the COP. The GCF will submit annual reports on policy 
implementation, programme priorities and eligibility criteria, as well as activities, 
financial resources and status of allocation for mitigation and adaptation.44 
The GCF has now concluded its interim stage. An independent secretariat is now being 
established and, with Hela Cheikhrouhou, an Executive Director has been selected. The 
Fund will now take up its work in Songdo, South Korea. The COP took note with 
appreciation of the GCF's report and provided initial guidance to: balance resource 
allocation between mitigation and adaptation, but to also ensure resources for other 
activities; to pursue a country-driven approach; and to take into special account the 
adaptation needs of vulnerable developing countries. The COP's guidance also confirms 
that all developing countries are eligible for resources of the GCF.45 
                                                
43 Decision -/CP.19,  Report of the Standing Committee on Finance to the Conference of the Parties, 
advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_scf.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
44 Decision -/CP.19, Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund 
advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_cop_gcf.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
45 Decision -/CP.19, Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to 
the Green Climate Fund, advance unedited version. Online at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_report_gcf.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
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The COP also provided additional guidance on the expeditious operationalisation of the 
GCF and its 2014 workplan, urging the GCF Board to finalise as soon as possible the 
essential requirements to receive, manage, programme and disburse financial 
resources46 that the GCF Board had identified at its fifth meeting in October 2013.47 The 
COP called for ambitious and timely contributions by developed countries with a view 
to devise a formal replenishment process by COP 20 in 2014, underlining that the initial 
mobilisation should reach a very significant scale. The Board was among others 
requested to consider important lessons learned on country-driven processes from other 
existing funds, and to report progress to the next meeting of the COP.48 
A press release by the GCF on November 19, 2013, reiterates the GCF Board's 
commitment to fulfil all essential institutional and administrative requirements by 
September 2014, so that countries can start filling up the fund. It may be hoped that this 
goal is reached, so the GCF can become an attractive financing vehicle in time for UN 
Secretary Ban Ki Moon's climate summit in autumn next year. The GCF will certainly 
profit to move from its three-year-long "becoming-fully-operational" institutionalisation 
to an actual operating phase, where questions of institutional arrangements are replaced 
with questions of funding priorities for transformational change in developing countries. 
However, hopes of developing countries that decisive steps towards institutionalisation 
of the GCF would lead to heightened ambition to pledge substantial financial resources 
by developed countries were disappointed. Once again the issue of mid- and long-term 
finance provisions came close to failure of the negotiations. Discussing the extension of 
the Work Programme on Long-Term Finance, developing and industrialised countries 
clashed in a familiar manner. Many developing countries stated that they expected 
COP19 to be a "finance COP", with clear and ambitious pledges for funding by 
developed countries, and a roadmap for scaling up climate finance levels from Fast Start 
Finance levels of 10bn USD annually to the 100 billion USD from 2020 commitment. 
Some developed countries, most notably Australia, but also the USA, rejected continued 
financing commitments or quantified pathways, while many developing countries called 
for a clear-cut mid-term target of 70 billion USD to be mobilised annually by 2016. 
The decision finally adopted omits any clear language on a roadmap for upscaled 
climate finance, but urges developed countries "to maintain continuity of mobilization 
of public climate finance at increasing levels from the fast-start finance period in line 
with their commitment to the goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year in 2020 from 
a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Green Climate Fund, Decisions of the Board - Fifth Meeting of the Board 8-10 October 2013. Online at 
http://gcfund.net/fileadmin/00_customer/documents/pdf/GCF_B05_23_Decisions_5th_Meeting_of_the_
Board_20131108.pdf, last accessed 12 December 2013. 
48 Report of and guidance to the CGF, supra note 45. 
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alternative sources".49 Developed countries are requested to prepare biennial 
submissions on their strategies and approaches for pathways in order to scale up mid-
term climate finance, including information on policies, programmes and priorities, 
actions and plans to mobilise additional finance, and balanced allocation of finance for 
mitigation and adaptation and for vulnerable countries. 
The decision also recognises the financial pledges made by countries at COP19, 
including the contributions to fulfil the fundraising goal of 100 million USD for the 
Adaptation Fund. The Work Programme on Long-Term Finance will continue until 
2020, and will also now include biennial high-level ministerial dialogues starting next 
year.  
Despite the generality of the decisions on Long Term Finance and the COP's guidance 
to the Green Climate Fund, Australia stated in the final COP/CMP plenary that its 
participation in the decision did not mean that it accepted provisions for developed 
countries to maintain and increase their climate finance, and on ambitious and timely 
contributions to the GCF. It may thus be feared that any future decisions to increase and 
strengthen the ambition of developed countries' financing commitments within the 
UNFCCC context will meet with strong resistance.  
11. Technology 
Technology transfer issues continued their slow but steady implementation process in 
Warsaw. Notably, Parties agreed on modalities and procedures of the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) that were suggested by its Advisory Board. In 
the previous year, UNEP had been chosen to host the CTCN as a leader of a consortium 
including UNIDO, but without modalities and procedures, the organisation had not been 
able to start its work. 
The modalities are now in place. The CTCN will support developing countries in 
devising technology needs assessments (TNAs), national adaptation programmes of 
action (NAPAs) and national climate strategies. It will also foster collaboration and 
access to information to accelerate climate technology transfer, and strengthen 
networks, partnerships and capacity-building. It will consult with the Technology 
                                                
49 Decision -/CP.19, Work programme on long-term finance, advance unedited version. Online at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_ltf.pdf, last accessed 
12 December 2013. 
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Executive Committee (TEC) in order to provide for coherent and synergistic 
approaches.50 
At a side event on the CTCN following the approval of the modalities and procedures, 
UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner hailed the CTCN as "a further building block 
towards that low-carbon future",51 and the NGO conference paper ECO declared: "The 
full operationalization of the Technology Mechanism now emerges as the good news 
story of COP 19."52  
However, one major struggle remains in the UN deliberations on technology transfer, 
the question of improved access to environmentally sound technologies covered under 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Many developing countries are keen to include 
access to IPRs in the Technology Mechanism, while industrialised countries are 
adamantly against their inclusion. Pushing back on a proposition championed by the 
G77 and China, the USA and Australia blocked a decision on guidance to the TEC as 
they objected to including a request to consider participation of the TEC as an observer 
at meetings of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).53 As a result, the SBI did not reach consensus in 
consideration of the report of the Technology Executive Committee. The agenda item 
will be taken up again at the SB meeting in June 2014.  
12. Groundhog Day on the Vistula 
12.1 Assessing the Warsaw Outcome 
Warsaw once again starkly highlighted the sharp divisions and lack of trust among 
countries. Industrialised countries’ collective lack of leadership on mitigation and 
means of implementation, sharply highlighted by Japan’s announcement to drastically 
reduce the level of ambition of its 2020 mitigation goal, the EU’s inability to move 
                                                
50 Decision -/CP.19, Modalities and procedures of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and its 
Advisory Board, advance unedited version. Online at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_ctcn.pdf, last 
accessed 12 December 2013. 
51 UNEP News Centre (21 November 2013), Climate Technology Centre and Network Ready to Assist 
Developing Countries. Online at: 
http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2755&ArticleID=9708&l=en, last accessed 
12 December 2013.  
52 CAN ECO (22 November 2013), Technology: A Good News Story. Online at 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/eco-nov22-english.pdf, last accessed 12 December 
2013. 
53 TWN Warsaw News Update 15 (18 November 2013), Progress on technology issues blocked by 
developed countries. Online at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/news/warsaw01/TWN_update15.pdf, last accessed 12 
December 2013. 
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beyond its already-achieved 2020 target, as well as Australia’s dismantling of its 
climate legislation and its particularly uncompromising stance on finance issues, 
strongly contributed to re-opening the traditional North-South divide. While recent 
years had seen an increasing differentiation among developing country positions, 
Warsaw to some extent saw a re-closing of ranks among the G77 and China. The 
LMDCs quite aggressively opposed any movement towards increased differentiation in 
the 2015 agreement. While some developing country groups, e.g. AOSIS, LDCs and 
AILAC, had presented themselves more flexible on the issue in the past, the collective 
ambition failure of industrialized countries did not allow them to continue a more 
collaborative negotiation strategy. Instead they (silently) joined the stance of the 
LMDCs. Consequently, G77 and China rhetoric centred around an unanimous call for 
more ambition from industrialised countries and the Brazilian proposal to determine 
post-2020 mitigation contributions on the basis of historical responsibility got strong 
support from many quarters. 
As a result of the fundamental divisions among Parties, the final text from ADP 
Workstream 1 hardly goes beyond the lowest common denominator. The reference to 
“contributions” instead of “commitments” accommodates the position of the LMDCs 
that there should be no binding commitments for non-Annex I countries. On the other 
side, Annex I countries prevented any differentiation between themselves and non-
Annex I countries regarding the legal nature of their participation in the future 
agreement; instead of differentiated provisions there is only one set of provisions that 
applies to all countries. The late date, the Lima COP, which was ultimately agreed on 
for the identification of the information that is to be submitted alongside the “intended 
contributions” is not helpful for ensuring that transparent and adequate contributions 
will be tabled in the first quarter of 2015. There is also no language whatsoever on what 
is going to be the process for the international consideration of the intended 
contributions once they have been submitted. While the submission of intended 
contributions is to be without prejudice to their legal nature, given the negotiation 
dynamics the 2015 agreement thus currently seems to be on course to continue the 
current structure: non-binding pledges that are determined purely bottom-up instead of 
being negotiated internationally. 
Some seem to expect that researchers and environmental organisations will compensate 
for the lack of a formal process to assess the “intended contributions”. Initiatives such 
as the UNEP Gap Report or the Climate Action Tracker have indeed strongly 
contributed to keeping the lack of ambition in the spotlight. However, such assessments 
do not appear out of thin air, doing them takes money. If governments want their peers’ 
“intended contributions” to be put under a public spotlight, which in particular the USA 
expects to be the main driver for increasing ambition, they will need to come up with 
the money to perform the wished-for assessments. 
The ADP Workstream 2’s discussion on enhancing pre-2020 ambition remained in a 
virtual deadlock during the Warsaw talks. Despite various efforts, it was not possible to 
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shift the narrative of the negotiations away from the historically dominant and 
confrontational narrative of “climate change mitigation as a burden on economic 
development” to a more co-operative one that emphasizes the (economic) opportunities 
that many mitigation options, particularly renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
entail. The AOSIS proposal to create a “Warsaw Workplan”, a technical process to 
enhance mitigation in different areas including improved deployment of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, could have been a promising road towards a more co-
operative narrative. Especially if it had been possible to integrate it with the proposal to 
engage in so-called ‘international cooperative initiatives’ as proposed by the EU and 
supported by many developed countries.  
Instead, parties repeated their well-known and extensively spelled-out positions. As in 
Workstream 1 Parties agreed only on their lowest common denominator: continuing 
negotiations at ministerial level in June. The only ADP Workstream 2 outcome in 
Warsaw that lies a bit off the beaten track is the invitation to parties to voluntarily 
cancel certified emission reductions generated under the Clean Development 
Mechanism as a means to close the mitigation gap. Given the current situation, this 
invitation appears to be more of a last resort to try to reanimate international carbon 
markets than as a serious move to close the mitigation gap. 
Looking at the recurring patterns of deliberations on finance within the UNFCCC, the 
outlook is bleak. Developed countries continue their reluctance to put forward 
ambitious financing for multilateral climate efforts. While matters of form, such as 
institutional arrangements, pass with relative ease, matters of substance, such as raising 
ambition of financing commitments, or clear roadmaps including defined milestones, 
result in by now well-known stand-offs between developed and developing countries.  
There certainly is no lack of disbursement channels, and with the final steps to a full 
operationalisation of the GCF, another major one will soon be open. Its monetisation 
should be a high priority for the planned high-level ministerials under the work 
programme on long-term finance. Anyhow, this also means serious work for the Fund's 
Board to establish clear funding priorities and criteria, but also for developing countries 
to demonstrate clear institutional structures that enable them to devise truly 
transformational approaches to mitigation and adaptation at a national level. Doing so 
will not only heighten their sense of ownership in their national combat against climate 
change, but may also induce developed countries to step up their multilateral financing 
efforts in the run-up to 2020. 
Familiar red lines appeared once more in the negotiations on the Convention's 
Technology Mechanism. The successful full launch of the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network may well be attributed to its "soft" mandate of capacity support, which 
anyhow will very much depend on a continuous and dependable funding base that has 
not been established yet. However, the COP's inability to reach consensus on its 
guidance to the Technology Executive Committee clearly results from some countries' 
Warsaw Groundhog Days 33 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 
efforts to stop any mention of intellectual property rights within the boundaries of the 
climate regime in its tracks.  
While it may be debatable if access to IPRs is truly a decisive issue for the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies in most cases, the ongoing impasse can be 
lamented. The TEC's participation as an observer in UN institutions relevant for 
technology transfer can have highly synergistic effects and could inform other fora of 
challenges and opportunities for technological cooperation at the climate and energy 
nexus. The strong opposition by Australia and the USA demonstrates their 
unwillingness to open up any pathways into the IPR issue. 
Against the background of the lack of progress in most other areas, the establishment of 
the “Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts” can be considered a meaningful outcome. Despite this new mechanism 
sitting under the Cancún Adaptation Framework, this step can be seen as a first 
recognition of the fact that climate change induces impacts that cannot be dealt with by 
implementing adaptation measures and that developing countries will need to be 
assisted in coping with these impacts. However, for this decision to become part of a 
larger success story and in order to adequately assist countries in coping with loss and 
damage, the mandate and scope of the mechanism will have to be further strengthened.    
Similarly, the decisions taken on REDD+ were greeted by many as a silver lining. With 
these decisions, the main chapters of the “rulebook for REDD+” have been finalized. 
However, the provisions are rather general and it remains to be seen how they will be 
applied on the ground and how they will influence ongoing REDD+ activities in 
developing countries. In addition, besides outstanding issues, such as the agreement on 
further guidance for reporting on safeguards, one central challenge remains: the lack of 
funding for REDD+ activities. Parties in Warsaw reiterated that financing will come 
from a large variety of sources, without further specifying where money will actually 
come from. Similarly, by assigning a “key role” to the Green Climate Fund, Parties 
decided to assign a core function for REDD+ financing to an entity which is currently 
still in the progress of becoming fully operational and yet to be filled up with funding.  
12.2 Who Will Lead Towards the 2015 Agreement? 
A fundamental question is which countries are supposed to be the drivers of ambition. 
Among the “big three”, the USA, China and the EU, China continues to maintain a very 
defensive position and while many lauded the US stance in Warsaw as constructive, it 
continues to be tied down by its domestic situation, where large parts of the Republican 
Party deny that climate change even exists. 
If the resistance of the LMDCs against binding commitments continues, they may in 
fact provide a convenient escape hatch to the USA. While the USA has long advocated 
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for a “bottom-up” regime “very different from the Kyoto Protocol”, they have also 
posited that they would be willing to accept legally binding commitments if all 
countries agreed to be legally bound. In truth, however, given the domestic situation in 
the USA, there is hardly any chance of a climate treaty gaining the 2/3 majority 
necessary for ratification by the US Senate. The US has in the past been accused of 
trying to drag everybody else down to the level of what they can achieve domestically, 
but if the LMDCs maintain the position they took in Warsaw they are likely to be 
assigned a major share of the blame for any shortcoming of the 2015 agreement. 
The EU has traditionally been the motor of the climate negotiations, all major advances 
came about when the EU was able to form a “green coalition” with other progressive 
countries, in particular the most vulnerable. However, leadership requires more than 
rhetoric, the EU will only be able to win and maintain allies if it is able to match words 
with substance. And substance is sorely lacking. The EU has only committed to keeping 
its emissions stable for the rest of the decade and only some of its member states have 
been willing to put meaningful amounts of finance on the table. As a result, the EU’s 
Durban alliance fractured one year later already since the EU was not able to meet its 
partners' expectations on mitigation and finance. And the EU also does not appear to be 
on track to bring serious ambition for the post-2020 period to the table. The UK 
Committee on Climate Change, a watchdog authority established by the UK Climate 
Change Act, has recommended that the EU should aim for a reduction of 55% below 
1990 levels by 2030.54 However, political discussions are gravitating around a mere 
40%. PointCarbon has projected that a 40% target would mean that the EU ETS would 
be oversupplied until about 2027.55  
If the EU wants to prevent Paris from becoming an event that is strong on pathos but 
empty on substance, it will have to do some serious homework.  
13. How to Escape from Groundhog Day? 
To those who expect the UNFCCC process to somehow deliver a top-down solution for 
the dangers of climate change, Warsaw was nothing more but another deep disappoint-
ment. However, the key to understanding the climate conferences is that they are not 
where decisions are taken: The decisions are taken in the national capitals. The 
positions countries take internationally are determined by their domestic political 
situations. International negotiations can therefore rarely take decisions that have not 
                                                
54 Committee on Climate Change (2010): The Fourth Carbon Budget, Reducing emissions through the 
2020s. London: Committee on Climate Change. Online at http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the-
fourth-carbon-budget-reducing-emissions-through-the-2020s-2/, last accessed 13 December 2013. 
55 PointCarbon, European Carbon Market to Remain Oversupplied Until 2027, 19 September 2013. Online 
at http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.2584441, last accessed 13 
December 2013. 
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previously been prepared nationally. And the current situation is that in most key 
countries there is as yet no appetite to undergo the fundamental economic and ecologic 
transformation that is necessary.  
If any meaningful outcome is to be produced, Parties will have to start seeing and 
utilizing the UNFCCC process differently. The UNFCCC can catalyse collaboration by 
creating a space for exchange and drawing public attention. Parties should, therefore, 
start seeing the UNFCCC as an enabler for domestic climate policy. The UN arena must 
be seen more as a starting point for action rather then as the place were THE process of 
making climate policy takes place. In this chapter, we develop ideas on how this can be 
achieved. 
13.1 A Misguided Narrative of Pain and Sacrifice 
One of the main reasons why progress is so slow is that many people are not convinced 
that it is actually possible to sharply reduce emissions without wrecking the economy. 
Industrialised countries fear that taking the lead will lead to deindustrialisation and 
developing countries see being able to emit CO2 without constraint as much-needed 
“development space”. While many have tried to stop talking about “burden sharing” and 
instead talk about “effort sharing”, “burden sharing” is what everyone has on their 
minds.56 
Yvo de Boer, the former head of the UNFCC secretariat, reportedly identified this lack 
of confidence in the viability of low-emission development as the key factor behind the 
failure of Copenhagen to deliver the hoped-for agreement.57 And this mind-set 
continues to be as present as it has ever been. When the EU was challenged in Warsaw 
about its inability to increase its target, the EU defended its position by arguing that 
achieving the reductions it had achieved had already taken an enormous amount of 
effort. 
With this mindset, it is not surprising that the main goal of most major emitters seems to 
be to shift as much as possible of this perceived burden to others, with everyone 
accusing everyone else of not doing their fair shares. International climate diplomacy is 
thus a game of Mikado where everybody thinks that they will lose out if they move 
first. 
However, the main distributional conflict is arguably within countries, not between 
countries. While all business models relying on the use of fossil fuels will clearly need 
                                                
56 As evidenced for example by a list of statements by political leaders quoted in Moomaw, William, and 
Mihaela Papa (2012): “Creating a mutual gains climate regime through universal clean energy 
services”, in: Climate Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 505-520, p. 507. 
57 Doha: Loss and damage in the desert - 10 Dec 2012 - James' Blog: a blog from BusinessGreen. Online 
at http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/james-blog/2230841/doha-loss-and-damage-in-the-desert, last 
accessed 17 December 2012. 
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to be changed or disappear entirely, whether reducing emissions does indeed impose a 
net economic burden at the macro level seems questionable for a number of reasons. 
First, maintenance of the current energy system is far from cheap and will tend to 
become ever more expensive in the future. According to a recent study by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world each year spends trillions of dollars on 
energy subsidies, which mostly benefit fossil fuel use. The IMF puts the value of the 
subsidies at 0.7% of world GDP on a pre-tax and 2.5% of world GDP on a post-tax 
basis (including externalities). And while the purported objective of these subsidies 
often is to help with energy access of the poor, according to the IMF, most of the 
benefits are actually captured by higher-income households. Just removing these 
subsidies could according to the IMF reduce CO2 emissions by 13%.
58 The recent World 
Energy Outlook (WEO) special report on climate change by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) complements that global fossil fuel subsidies are six times the level of 
support received by renewable energy technologies and that 15% of global CO2 
emissions effectively receive an incentive of US$110 per tonne through fossil-fuel 
subsidies.59 
The EU alone spends around €400 billon on oil imports each year, which corresponds 
to around 3% of the EU’s GDP. The IEA’s chief economist Fatih Birol has commented 
that this is “the equivalent of a Greek crisis – every year“. Sub-Saharan African 
countries in 2011 spent more on oil imports ($18bn) than they received in official 
development assistance (ODA) ($15.6bn).60  
Second, in the mid-term a large share of the necessary emission reductions can be 
achieved at a net economic benefit through efficiency improvements. The IEA for the 
2012 WEO developed an “Efficient World Scenario” that is based on doing no more 
than exploiting energy efficiency opportunities which justify themselves economically 
in terms of rates of return and payback periods but are not being utilised due to a variety 
of barriers. According to the IEA, mobilising this potential through appropriate policies 
to remove these barriers would result in a global emission trajectory that up to 2020 
would be nearly identical with the IEA’s 450 Scenario, which represents a trajectory 
that would lead to a stabilisation of atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-
eq. The Efficient World Scenario would lead to a peak of energy-related CO2 emissions 
before 2020, and even up to 2035 implementation of the Efficient World Scenario 
would take the world nearly halfway to the 450 Scenario. 
                                                
58 International Monetary Fund (2013): Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications. January 28, 
2013. Online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
59 IEA (2013): Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map. World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris: 
OECD/IEA. Online at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimatemap, last accessed 24 June 
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60 Quoted in: The Guardian: Overseas aid to Africa being outweighed by hefty costs of importing oil, 1 April 
2012. Online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/01/overseas-aid-africa-oil-imports-
costs?newsfeed=true, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
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According to the IEA, the Efficient World Scenario would result in a more efficient 
allocation of resources, boosting cumulative economic output through 2035 by US$18 
trillion, with a 0.4% higher global GDP in 2035 than in the New Policies Scenario, 
which reflects current and announced policies. Additional investment of $11.8 trillion in 
more efficient end-use technologies would be needed, but this would be more than 
offset by a US$17.5 trillion reduction in fuel expenditures and US$5.9 trillion lower 
supply-side investment. One may also note that the scenario mainly considers 
incremental changes to the technologies and practices used, but not more holistic 



























Figure 1: Energy-related CO2 emissions in the 2012 WEO’s Current Policies, New Policies, 
Efficient World and 450 Scenarios61 
Third, the picture on the energy provision side is changing rapidly. Equipment costs of 
solar photovoltaics (PV) have fallen by about 80% within the last five years. Wind 
turbine costs have fallen by 29% in the same timeframe even though starting from a 
much lower level.62 A recent report by GTM Research notes that 2009 industry 
roadmaps were targeting US$1.00/W module costs as a medium-term goal, while in fact 
best-in-class Chinese producers are now already approaching costs of US$0.50/W. The 
report projects that solar PV module costs will fall further to US$0.36 per watt by the 
end of 2017.63 McKinsey has similarly projected that solar PV costs will continue to fall 
by as much as 10% annually by 2020.64 A recent report by Citigroup projects that both 
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wind and solar will be fully competitive with other energy sources in most parts of the 
world by 2020.65 Analysts note that 2/3 of the about 100GW of solar PV that is 
currently installed globally has been installed in the last 2.5 years, and project that 
another 100GW will be installed in the next 2.5 years.66 
Ironically, these developments are to a large extent driven by some of the countries that 
are among the most recalcitrant within the UNFCCC. While Japan now has a target that 
would allow it to increase its emissions, it is projected to become the world’s largest 
solar PV market this year, neck to neck with China.67 Japan argues that the shutdown of 
all of its nuclear plants post-Fukushima made its change of targets necessary, but 
according to analysis by Ecofys, Climate Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research, even fully replacing all those nuclear plants with coal would 
merely halve the original target.68 Given the rapid scale-up of renewables, Japan’s actual 
emission trajectory can thus probably be expected to be much more climate friendly 
than its new target indicates. And while China took a hard-line position on the issue of 
taking binding commitments in Warsaw, it at the same time went to great length to 
showcase its substantial investment in climate-friendly technologies and the launch of 
regional pilot emission trading systems. Some analysts, including ones like Citigroup 
that can probably not necessarily be considered to be environmentally blinkered, even 
consider that Chinese coal consumption may flatten within this very decade, driven by 
the government’s desire to shift the economy away from manufacturing, more modest 
growth targets, plans to cut air pollution and to aggressively push non-coal energy 
sources.69 
Fourth, in addition to the global climate externality fossil fuel use also causes 
substantial local externalities that have to be borne by the public, such as local air, water 
and land pollution. Climate change is far from the only problem the world has with its 
current fossil-based energy system. A recent study by Stuttgart University concluded 
that local air pollution from fossil fuel use causes 22,000 premature deaths per year in 
Europe, as well as costs of billions of Euros for disease treatment and lost working 
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days.70 Another recent study concluded that 500 million people in Northern parts of 
China have a 5.5 year lower life expectancy (which amounts to in total 2.5 billion life 
years lost) than their Southern compatriots due to higher air pollution from coal 
combustion, which is 55% higher than in Southern China.71  
Fifth, much of the discussion is being dominated by fears of carbon leakage. The 
question is, however, what percentage of emissions is actually exposed to this risk? Is 
transport going to be relocated if some countries pursue stringent climate policy and 
other countries do not? Are buildings going to be relocated? Are power plants, waste, 
agriculture and forestry going to be? And even in industry most sectors are either not 
emission intensive or not strongly exposed to international competition.72 Nevertheless, 
overall climate ambition is being substantially held back by concern about a rather 
minor share of overall emissions.  
Emission reduction policies hence also provide strong immediate benefits to society. 
Whether the net macroeconomic impact will be positive or negative at the very least 
seems to be an open question. It may well be that “the current world energy system (and 
with it the entire, fossil fuel-based world economy) is situated in a “local sub-optimum” 
– as a sled is stuck in a local hollow, which is separated from a deep valley (the “global 
optimum”) only by a short and relatively gently rising slope. If one exerts a minor extra 
effort to push the sled across the slope, the vehicle can get moving rapidly! The energy 
transition needs exactly this push from governments – in the long term the extra-
investment will pay off double, triple and manifold.”73 
The above-mentioned finding that energy subsidies mostly benefit wealthy rather than 
poor households points to where the probably more pertinent problem lies: Climate 
policy is essentially economic policy and will have substantial distributional impacts. 
While at the macro level benefits may well outweigh negative impacts even without 
taking into account climate damages, at the micro level there will be losers as well as 
winners, which naturally engenders resistance. Companies and entire sectors that have 
so far based their business models on the use of fossil fuels will either have to 
fundamentally restructure, or be replaced by others that provide the same societal 
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service in a low-emission manner. According to the recent IEA special report, net 
revenues for existing nuclear and renewables-based power plants would be boosted by 
US$1.8 trillion (in year-2011 dollars) through to 2035 in the 450 Scenario, while the 
revenues from existing coal-fired plants would decline by a similar level. 8% of new 
fossil-fuelled plants would be retired before their investment is fully recovered.74 
Pursuing a 2°C compatible climate policy would also strongly devalue the majority of 
global fossil fuel reserves. According to the IEA and others, at least 2/3 of global fossil 
fuel reserves will need to remain untouched if the 2°C target is to be met. However, 
these reserves are already on companies’ books. Analysis by HSBC concluded that if 
adequate policies to achieve the 2°C target were introduced, this could strip as much as 
60% of the market value off fossil fuel companies.75  
Those who stand to lose from the low-carbon transition have so far managed to 
dominate the political narrative while the innovation impulses and new markets created 
by climate policy have so far not received adequate attention. This narrative will need to 
be turned from its head on its feet if climate policy is ever to get where it needs to be 
going. 
13.2 Pioneers Needed 
However, the increasing piles of studies that show that ditching fossil fuel use is 
feasible and yields multiple benefits for economic well-being are obviously not 
sufficient to persuade a majority of people. Mental infrastructures are apparently as 
difficult to change as physical infrastructure. Most people will likely only become 
convinced of the viability of going low-carbon if they see it in practice. 
Pioneers showing that it is possible are hence critical. This could help creating a 
virtuous cycle where the international process serves to keep the climate issue on the 
agenda and at the same time catalyses bottom-up processes, which then in turn inject 
further momentum into the international process. Ambitious action by frontrunners also 
induces technological learning, which makes it easier for others to follow. For example, 
the strong promotion of renewables by Denmark, Germany and other countries have 
induced massive cost reductions. The most striking case is solar PV where for each 
doubling of globally installed capacity the costs have dropped by 22%. And as noted 
above these trends are set to continue and analysts expect that both wind and solar will 
be fully competitive with other energy sources in most parts of the world by 2020 
Mobilising for leadership will require political engagements at all levels. Progress in 
climate policy will only be possible if sufficiently large pro-climate advocacy coalitions 
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can be brought together in the key countries and across borders to overcome the 
blocking power of incumbent industries whose business models rely on using fossil 
fuels. And while it is certainly not able to the save climate on its own, the international 
climate process can serve as a key catalyst for the national discussions. While 
Copenhagen did not produce the hoped-for treaty, the deadline imposed by the 
Copenhagen conference injected a significant momentum into national discussions. One 
country after another elaborated domestic targets and actions, and presented them to the 
international audience. The run-up to Copenhagen hence resulted in a much better 
understanding of national mitigation potentials, available policy options and actions that 
countries are prepared to take. This momentum would hardly have materialised without 
the positive pressure exerted by the Copenhagen deadline. And in keeping this 
momentum, emission reduction actions are getting implemented in many countries 
around the globe, even if far from the scale that is needed.76 
The run-up to 2015 must hence be seized as a catalyst to build national momentum. One 
key opportunity is the world leaders’ summit on climate change UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon will convene on 23 September 2014. Such a summit is exactly what some 
analysts have called for: 
“The decisions required in 2015 will be momentous... These decisions are not 
within the powers of environment ministers, and they will not happen of their 
own accord. They require the direct engagement of heads of government, under 
the full glare of a summit spotlight. And that summit requires the kind of 
pressure that only the coordinated mobilization of global civil society — 
including the scientific community, businesses, non-governmental organizations 
and youth movements — can achieve.”77 
13.3 Does the Climate Regime Need New Types of Mitigation 
Commitments? 
Some analysts consider that a key factor in the framing of the narrative that emission 
reductions mean economic pain is how commitments are framed. 
In general, commitments may be “obligations of result” or “obligations of conduct”.78 
That is, commitments may refer to what countries are supposed to do or to what they are 
supposed to achieve. The World Trade Organisation is one example that prescribes 
desired behaviour rather than desired outcomes. The WTO does not prescribe how 
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much countries should trade, it prescribes what policies and measures countries should 
pursue and must not pursue in order to promote and not impede trade. The climate 
regime has so far been outcome-based, commitments in the Kyoto Protocol have been 
conceived of in terms of emission targets and there is a widespread sentiment that 
emission targets for developing countries would also be the most adequate approach to 
address climate change. This may be called a very “scientific” approach. As climate 
change is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere, it 
was concluded that policy should put a cap on emissions and ratchet that cap down over 
time. And ideally use this cap as a basis for an emission trading system, which would 
put a price on emissions and thus drive investments and innovation into low-emission 
alternatives. 
However, arguably all political incentives point in the direction of setting weak rather 
than strong emission targets. There is hardly any country in the world where setting 
strong emission targets yields political rewards for politicians. To the contrary, as noted 
above emissions are seen by many decision makers as inextricably linked to economic 
well-being; framing commitments in terms of emission reductions therefore arguably 
directly triggers the perspective of seeing climate protection as an economic loss. This 
general tendency is compounded by the political influence of special interest groups 
who will indeed lose out from shifting economies away from emission-intensive 
business models. 
In addition, it is in fact hardly possible for governments to credibly promise 
achievement of specific future emission levels as emissions are strongly influenced by 
factors such as economic and population growth which governments can at best 
influence indirectly, if at all. Technology choices are in many cases also not under the 
control of national policy as most countries are technology takers. These risks are 
especially pertinent for rapidly industrialising countries. Rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation is in itself a challenge for reducing emissions. In addition, future emission 
levels are much more difficult to forecast in rapidly growing economies than in less 
rapidly growing ones. 
In addition, turning the Earth’s GHG absorption capacity into a commodity inevitably 
gives rise to controversy about who should receive what share of this commodity. One 
reason why quantitative commitments are contentious is because they are equivalent to 
giving countries money – lots of money. Stiglitz opines that, “If emissions were 
appropriately restricted, the value of emission rights would be a couple trillion dollars a 
year – no wonder that there is a squabble over who should get them.”79 Countries thus 
have an incentive to keep their commitments as weak as possible in order to maximise 
the volume of sellable allowances. 
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Moreover, the Kyoto approach effectively caps ambition. If a country overachieves its 
target, this yields no benefit to the atmosphere. Instead, the overachievement yields a 
surplus of emission allowances, which can be sold to others or banked to offset required 
emission reductions elsewhere or in the future. Which is exactly what is supposed to 
happen according to textbook theory, based on an assumption of adequate ambition, but 
in the real world this system rather serves to lock in insufficient levels of ambition.  
The theoretical advantage of quantity commitments, that they provide clarity on the 
environmental outcome, therefore loses much of its lustre as in practice it has turned out 
to be near-impossible to set commitments at the required level, or indeed to set any 
commitments at all. 
Finally, it may also be fundamentally sub-complex to see climate change solely through 
the lens of emissions as this frames climate change as an environmental problem. But 
arguably climate change is fundamentally a development problem, not a traditional 
environmental problem, so the traditional end-of-pipe approach to environmental 
regulation will arguably not do. Industrialised countries will have to fundamentally 
redevelop their economies and developing countries will have to develop fundamentally 
different from how industrialised countries have (mis-)developed. 
Unfortunately, in the UNFCCC sustainable development has been relegated to the status 
of a "co-benefit" that is seen as nice to have but not strictly necessary. Which is 
fundamentally at odds with the priorities of developing countries, who clearly see 
development as their fundamental priority and emission reductions as a co-benefit. And 
while they are not as explicit about it, the same also applies to the traditional 
industrialised countries. When looking for example at the German Renewable Energy 
Act, it lists four objectives that are to be achieved. And only one of these relates to 
climate and the environment, the other three are immediate benefits the German 
legislator hopes to achieve: Reducing the long-term macro-economic cost of energy 
supply, preserving fossil energy resources and promoting technology development.80  
The climate regime would therefore profit from recognising that climate change is far 
from being the only rationale driving emission reduction policy and from turning the 
priorities around and framing commitments in a way that puts sustainable development 
benefits front and centre. 
13.4 Considering Multi-Dimensional Commitments 
The climate regime clearly needs a reference to emissions as these constitute the 
environmental problem that is supposed to be solved. However, as discussed above the 
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Kyoto approach arguably has several weaknesses. Emission targets should not be 
tradable and bankable by governments to reduce the incentives to adopt weak 
commitments and to prevent targets from becoming a cap on ambition. Emission 
trading should only be pursued at the level of companies, for example in domestic 
emission trading systems, as companies actually make their trading and investment 
decisions on the basis of economic rather than political considerations.  
In addition, emission targets should be complemented by other types of commitments 
that allow to marry development and climate aspirations and that are more in line with 
what governments can actually deliver: implement policies. Technology scale-up and 
energy efficiency improvements can be more directly influenced by government action 
than emissions and may dovetail with countries’ and citizens’ interests to promote 
certain technologies and energy security.  
Multi-dimensional commitments would also reduce the risk of failure if the different 
components are not perceived as building blocks of one ambitious target but rather 
prescribe the same emission reductions from various perspectives. EU Climate 
Commissioner Hedegaard recently opined that having more than only a GHG target was 
“wise”. “During the economic crisis we had more than one target and that has helped us 
a lot. Imagine if we had only had a CO2 target and the ETS (Emissions Trading System) 
during this crisis. Would Europe have continued to have such a strong focus on energy 
efficiency and renewables? I don’t believe it.”81 
Multi-dimensional commitments could for example relate to scale-up of certain 
technologies, economic inputs or certain policies. As for economic inputs, taking the 
example of energy-related CO2 emissions, which account for about 60% of global 
emissions, these are determined by: size of the population, size of the economy, energy 
intensity of the economy and CO2 intensity of energy supply. Economic and population 
trends are largely beyond the influence of governments and will anyway hardly be made 
subject of international agreements. Governments should therefore commit to reducing 
the energy intensity of the economy and reducing the CO2 intensity of energy 
provision.82 
Some analysts argue that the climate regime should shift fully to a policy-based 
approach, taking as their model the WTO with its high level of detailed policy 
coordination.83 However, while such an approach may have much to recommend it, it 
bears noting that the WTO also started out small, focusing mostly on tariffs, and took 
half a century to develop to its current status. 
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Nonetheless, there are key policy levers that recommend themselves for special 
attention. One is fossil fuel subsidies, which should be phased out by all countries as 
soon as possible. As noted above, according to the IEA global fossil fuel subsidies are 
currently six times the level of support received by renewable energy technologies and 
15% of global CO2 emissions effectively receive an incentive of US$110 per tonne 
through fossil-fuel subsidies. Since the benefits from these subsidies are mostly 
captured by wealthy households, the social impacts of removing them should be 
manageable, but will nevertheless require attention. A win-win approach would be to 
redirect the resources that have so far gone into subsidies into supporting low-income 
households in upgrading the energy efficiency of their buildings, appliances and 
transport options. 
In addition, governments should incorporate the costs of climate change into all 
government procurement decisions, in particular investment decisions on long-lived 
infrastructure. In infrastructure planning in developing countries that is done on behalf 
of development agencies, the usual method of valuation in feasibility studies is to 
include damage costs into the shadow pricing procedure. That is, instead of market 
prices, investment decisions are based on a shadow price that includes all territorial and 
exterritorial externalities that will be caused by the investment, as the otherwise 
neglected external effects have to be paid by the inhabitants of the state. This kind of 
decision-making should not only apply to developing countries which need the support 
of international development banks. It should be generally recommended as standard 
governmental procedure, including in industrialised countries, as the rational of this 
procedure does also hold for them. One further benefit would be that negative income 
effects for society as a whole as result of external effects could be avoided. 
Parties should ideally also commit to limiting fossil fuel extraction. As noted above, 
analysis by the IEA and others suggests that to achieve 2°C at least 2/3 of global fossil 
fuel reserves will need to be left untouched. But currently the same governments that 
are trying to reduce fossil fuel use are at the same time still promoting the maximum 
possible exploitation of fossil fuel reserves and are often even shareholders of the 
resource extracting companies.  
It would be desirable to agree on a list of commitment types that would be mandatory 
for all countries. However, such an approach is for the time being probably beyond 
what is politically possible, given that many countries have been defensive or even 
openly hostile against having any kind of international processes determine or assess 
what they should do. As a result, as noted the latest ADP decision stipulates that 
“contributions” will be “nationally determined”.  
Nonetheless, countries should at least be strongly encouraged to think about the future 
climate regime more multi-dimensionally than only in terms of GHGs. Taking a multi-
dimensional approach to commitments could well build on what is already taking place 
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under the UNFCCC. Many developing countries have made multi-dimensional Copen-
hagen/Cancún pledges, the same may be the case for their 2015 contributions.  
In addition, there is a plethora of policy and action-based initiatives under development. 
The NAMAs that are currently being developed all have direct sustainable development 
benefits front and centre. Other examples are the attempts to regulate HFCs under the 
Montreal Protocol, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, the G-20 process to address 
fossil fuel subsidies and the new Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes. The 
“Renewables Club” founded by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Morocco, South Africa, China, Tonga, United Arab Emirates and India could also be a 
vehicle to push forward concrete action, but so far it has rather been lacking in 
substance. 
International climate policy may thus incrementally expand its scope to better marry 
countries’ development and climate objectives than it has done so far. 
 
 
 
